Libya and Chad Launch Joint Border Force: A New Chapter in Regional Security Cooperation

Date: November 15, 2025

In a significant move to address mounting security challenges in the Sahel, the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Chadian Armed Forces have announced the formation of a joint border force to secure their shared frontier. This development marks a potential turning point in a relationship historically marred by conflict and comes as both nations grapple with cross-border threats that undermine regional stability .

1. Formation and Structure of the Joint Force

The joint border initiative was formally announced through Libya’s Military Media Division, revealing that the force was established under the direct directives of Lieutenant General Saddam Haftar, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the LNA. The assignment brings together specialized units from both nations with deep expertise in desert operations .

The operational components include:

· LNA Ground Forces: Providing the central command and coordination structure
· Border Guard Administration: Offering institutional knowledge of border management
· Subul Al-Salam Battalion: Contributing specialized desert patrol capabilities for immediate field operations

This collaborative structure has been tasked with immediate deployment in remote border areas that have long served as havens for trafficking networks and armed smugglers moving between the Sahel and southern Libya .

2. Addressing Complex Security Challenges

The joint force initiative responds to multiple security threats that have exploited the vast, ungoverned desert spaces along the Libya-Chad border. These challenges have evolved significantly since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, which created a security vacuum that numerous armed groups have exploited .

Key security concerns driving this cooperation include:

· Cross-border militias: Chad has repeatedly expressed concern about Libyan territory serving as rear bases for Chadian rebel groups, most notably the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), whose members were implicated in the death of President Idriss Déby in April 2021 .
· Trafficking networks: The border region has become a major transit route for organized criminal groups smuggling everything from weapons to illicit goods .
· Regional spillover effects: The ongoing conflict in Sudan, particularly in Darfur, has increased pressure on the porous borders between Sudan, Chad, and Libya, with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) accused of ethnic violence and creating new refugee flows .

3. Historical Context: From Conflict to Cooperation

The new security partnership represents a dramatic shift in Libya-Chad relations, which have been historically characterized by regional rivalry and open conflict. The two countries have a complex history dominated by the 1980s war over the Aouzou Strip, a conflict that shaped the military careers of both nations’ current leaders .

This historical backdrop includes:

· Personal connections: The 1987 Battle of Wadi Doum resulted in the capture of Khalifa Haftar (father of current LNA deputy commander Saddam Haftar) by Chadian forces, creating a personal history that has lingered in the collective memory of both militaries .

· Post-Gaddafi reversal: Following the fall of the Libyan government in 2011, the power dynamic shifted, with southern Libyan areas becoming operational bases for various Chadian rebel groups who found Libya’s institutional vacuum fertile ground for establishing themselves .

· Strategic recalculations: For Chad, cooperation offers the potential to more effectively monitor migration flows from Sudan and reduce the impact of trafficking networks operating from Libyan territory .

4. Regional Implications and Geopolitical Significance

The Libya-Chad joint force extends beyond bilateral border management, representing a strategic realignment in a region where traditional powers have reduced their military footprint while other international players like Russia and the United Arab Emirates gain influence .

The regional implications are substantial:

· Security leadership: For Benghazi, strengthening its presence in the southern regions represents an opportunity to reaffirm its role as a regional security actor capable of projecting power and stabilizing troubled frontiers .

· Containing spillover: With Sudan descending further into conflict, particularly in Darfur, the joint force aims to prevent the movement of armed groups across a territorial arc stretching from Fezzan to Tibesti and into western Sudan .

· International engagement: The United States has also shown interest in supporting border security efforts, with recent discussions between Libyan officials and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) focusing on counterterrorism, border security, and tackling irregular migration .

Table: Key Regional Security Challenges Along the Libya-Chad Border

5. Future Prospects and Conclusion

The joint border force represents more than a tactical security arrangement—it signals a potential broader reconciliation between two key Sahel nations with a troubled history. Future prospects for this cooperation appear to be expanding, with discussions already underway about potentially reopening the formal border crossing between Libya and Chad to boost regional commerce once security conditions improve .

This development aligns with longer-term efforts supported by international partners to develop an Integrated Border Management (IBM) system for Libya. The recently completed ALBSaM project (Advancing Libya’s Border Security and Management), implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) with funding from the Czech Republic, worked specifically toward this goal from 2022-2024 .

As Lieutenant General Saddam Haftar continues his oversight of border operations, including recent visits to key crossing points, the joint force represents an attempt to present the LNA as a guarantor of security for territory that has largely been governed by the logic of force since 2011 . The success or failure of this initiative will undoubtedly have profound implications not only for Libya and Chad but for the wider Sahel region struggling with interconnected security, political, and humanitarian challenges.

The Libya-Chad joint border force stands as a test case for whether historical adversaries can transform contested frontiers from zones of conflict into areas of cooperation, potentially writing a new chapter in Pan-African security collaboration.

From the Libyan side, the “Subul as-Salam” battalion located in the al-Kufra area will cooperate with the Chadian military and conduct patrols.