RABAT, Morocco — October 1, 2026 — Amnesty International has accused Moroccan authorities of operating an extensive surveillance system targeting journalists, human rights defenders, activists and other critical voices, following the publication of a new investigation based partly on testimony from a former Moroccan intelligence official.

The organization says its report, “We Start With the Verdict: Inside Morocco’s Surveillance Machine,” provides new evidence about how Morocco’s domestic intelligence service, the Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DGST), allegedly combined commercial spyware with more traditional surveillance techniques to monitor people inside and outside the country.

Moroccan authorities have repeatedly denied using spyware to target citizens. Amnesty said it contacted Moroccan authorities four weeks before publication of the report but received no response.

A surveillance system combining digital and physical monitoring

According to Amnesty, the alleged surveillance operation went beyond smartphone spyware.

The organization says its investigation identified a combination of:

• spyware;
• phone interception;
• physical surveillance;
• hidden microphones and recording equipment;
• movement tracking;
• compromised mobile devices;
• network-based attacks;
• and other forms of digital monitoring.

Amnesty says the system was allegedly used against journalists, lawyers, academics, activists, political figures and other people regarded as critical of the authorities.

The report is based on testimony from a former employee of Morocco’s domestic intelligence service, leaked documents, surveillance records, forensic evidence and previous journalistic investigations.

Amnesty describes the former intelligence employee as providing an unusually detailed account of how the surveillance system allegedly operated from inside the security establishment.

The Pegasus connection

One of the most significant elements of the investigation concerns Pegasus, the highly invasive spyware developed by Israel-based NSO Group.

Pegasus can allow an operator to access information stored on a targeted smartphone and, depending on the method used, potentially activate functions such as the device’s microphone or camera.

Amnesty says its latest investigation identifies the DGST as the Moroccan entity responsible for deploying Pegasus and documents its use against activists and journalists between 2017 and 2021, with evidence suggesting possible activity beyond that period.

Morocco has previously denied using Pegasus against its citizens.

The issue has nevertheless been the subject of international investigations for years, including forensic examinations of devices belonging to Moroccan journalists and human rights defenders.

103 phone numbers examined

One of the report’s most detailed findings concerns records from Morocco’s Pegasus system.

Amnesty says it analyzed 103 Moroccan telephone numbers entered into the Pegasus system between September and December 2017 and was able to associate them with identifiable individuals.

According to the organization, 65 were members of civil society, including:

• 34 human rights defenders;
• 22 journalists and media workers;
• five lawyers; and
• four academics.

Another 25 numbers were associated with political representatives or officials, while five belonged to diplomats or representatives of international organizations. The remaining eight were associated with businesspeople, religious figures or other individuals whose identities or categorization were unclear.

Amnesty argues that the composition of the records indicates that journalists and human rights defenders were among the priority targets of the surveillance system.

That conclusion is Amnesty’s assessment of the evidence rather than an independently established finding by a court.

From spyware to physical surveillance

The investigation also alleges that Moroccan authorities used traditional intelligence methods alongside digital technology.

Amnesty says people were allegedly followed and secretly recorded in locations including detention facilities, offices, vehicles and private residences.

The organization also reports allegations that microphones were hidden in locations associated with journalists and that some mobile phones were physically compromised.

Another allegation concerns mobile-phone retailers. Amnesty says its whistleblower described cooperation between intelligence personnel and phone shops to provide devices that had already been compromised with spyware.

These allegations, if independently established, would demonstrate how modern spyware can be integrated into a much broader intelligence-gathering operation.

Network surveillance

Amnesty also says it identified evidence involving attacks delivered through telecommunications infrastructure.

The report alleges that spyware was delivered through network-injection techniques involving Maroc Telecom, Morocco’s state-owned telecommunications operator.

Network injection can allow an attacker to interfere with internet traffic and redirect a targeted device toward malicious content without necessarily requiring the user to open a suspicious message.

Amnesty says it identified several infection methods, including physical device compromise, one-click attacks, zero-click attacks and network injection.

International technology suppliers

The report also raises questions about the international market for surveillance technology.

Amnesty says Moroccan authorities acquired surveillance tools from companies based in Israel, the European Union and the United States.

The organization identifies NSO Group and other companies associated with spyware, network surveillance and digital-forensics technologies.

The findings place Morocco within a much wider global market in which governments purchase technologies capable of monitoring communications and extracting information from digital devices.

This raises questions not only about the governments using such technologies, but also about the companies that develop, sell and support them.

The wider Pegasus controversy

Pegasus has become one of the world’s most closely scrutinized commercial spyware systems.

Governments and technology companies have defended surveillance technologies as tools that can be used against terrorism and serious crime.

Human rights organizations, however, have repeatedly raised concerns about the potential use of such technologies against journalists, political opponents, lawyers and civil society organizations.

The Moroccan case has been part of this wider international controversy for years.

Previous forensic investigations by Amnesty identified Pegasus infection attempts against Moroccan human rights defenders, while the latest investigation seeks to connect individual cases to a broader institutional surveillance structure.

Morocco’s response

Moroccan authorities have repeatedly denied using spyware to spy on their citizens.

That denial remains an important part of the story.

Amnesty says it sent its findings to Moroccan authorities approximately four weeks before publishing the report but did not receive a response.

Consequently, the latest allegations should be understood in the context of a continuing dispute between Moroccan authorities and rights organizations over the country’s use of surveillance technology.

Why the allegations matter

The dispute extends beyond Morocco.

The case illustrates a growing challenge for journalists, activists and civil society organizations worldwide: sophisticated surveillance technologies can potentially operate without obvious signs that a person’s phone or computer has been compromised.

A conventional wiretap may require access to a telecommunications system. Modern spyware can potentially place an entire digital life within reach of an operator.

That includes communications, photographs, contacts, location information and, depending on the technology and circumstances, microphone and camera functions.

For journalists, the implications are particularly significant because confidential communications with sources can be central to investigative reporting.

For human rights defenders, surveillance can expose networks of colleagues, family members, lawyers and supporters.

The broader African technology question

The Morocco case also raises a broader question for Africa’s rapidly expanding digital environment.

African governments increasingly depend on digital communications, telecommunications networks and imported cybersecurity technologies.

The same technologies can strengthen national security and investigations against serious crime. They can also create significant privacy risks when deployed without adequate legal safeguards, independent oversight and judicial accountability.

The challenge is therefore not simply whether governments should possess surveillance capabilities.

It is how those capabilities are acquired, authorized, controlled and audited — and what protections exist for citizens when surveillance powers are abused.

What happens next?

Amnesty is calling on Moroccan authorities to stop what it describes as unlawful surveillance of journalists and human rights defenders and to establish an independent investigation into the alleged activities of the DGST.

The organization is also calling for stronger international controls on the export of spyware and other privacy-invasive technologies to Morocco until adequate human-rights safeguards are established.

The Moroccan government’s response will be closely watched.

So too will any independent investigations capable of testing Amnesty’s allegations against additional documentary, technical or judicial evidence.

For now, the central issue is not simply the existence of sophisticated spyware.

It is whether surveillance technology has been used against people exercising fundamental rights — and whether institutions can provide credible mechanisms for establishing the truth.

Panafrican.email will continue to follow developments surrounding Morocco’s surveillance technology, press freedom, cybersecurity and digital-rights environment.